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HART'S DEFINITION AND THEORY IN
JURISPRUDENCE AGAIN
by Robert Birningham*
I will say what Hart's classic paper' means in, or translate it into,
contemporary philosophical discourse. But to give a context for it, I
start by talking about MacCormick's recent book, H.L.A. Hart.2 We
come away from reading its introductory chapter, a chapter Summers
calls "fascinating,"13 having learned that Hart was trained not as a le-
gal philosopher or jurisprude as such but as a lawyer and separately as
a philosopher. MacCormick's respect for or awe of Hart's training ap-
pears in what I will quote. Regarding Hart's career at the bar, Mac-
Cormick tells us Hart was a barrister from 1932 to 1940, litigating
"such complicated matters as trusts, family settlements and succes-
sion."4 World War II terminated Hart's legal career. Before becoming
a barrister Hart had studied philosophy with Joseph at Oxford, gradu-
ating in 1929, having "performed brilliantly."5 Hart "became a civil
servant in military intelligence"6 in the war, hence he survived it.7 Hav-
ing talked to Ryle and Hampshire, who were also in intelligence, Hart
decided not to return to practice law but became "a respected member
of the new school of post-war Oxford philosophers." 8 Legal philosophy
is not prestigious like contracts or metaphysics. Until recently, its prac-
* Professor of Law, University of Connecticut School of Law. A.B., J.D., Ph.D. University of
Pittsburgh; LL.M. Harvard University. Professor Birmingham teaches Contracts and
Jurisprudence.
1. H.L.A. HART, Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence, in EssAYs IN JURISPRUDENCE AND
PHILOSOPHY 21 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Definition and Theory), reprinted from Hart, Defini-
tion and Theory in Jurisprudence, 70 LAw. Q. REv. 37 (1954).
2. N. MACCORMICK, H.L.A. HART (1981).
3. Summers, Professor MacCormick on H.LA. Hart's Legal Theory, 31 Am w. J. Co.tP. L
481, 481 (1983).
4. N. MACCORMICK, supra note 2, at 2.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. For example, he did not cease to serve, as many others did, by failing to exit from a falling
bomber by a hatch too small to accommodate him together with his parachute. Cf. F. DYsoN,
DISTURBING THE UNIVERSE 26-28 (1979).
8. N. MACCORMICK, supra note 2, at 2-3.
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titioners would likely have been academics having formal training
mainly in law but lacking extensive practical legal experience and in-
tensive formal training in philosophy. Hart, when Oxford appointed
him Professor of Jurisprudence in 1952, had not studied jurisprudence
but had studied its ingredient disciplines.
This much by page three. Then MacCormick tells us Hart's "inau-
gural lecture on 'Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence' [Definition
and Theory] put him at once in controversy when he announced the
relevance of the new philosophy to long-standing juristic controversies
over the nature of legal concepts." MacCormick has used the word
'new' to modify both 'philosophy' and 'school of philosophy' but has
told us little of what was new. What Hart did was apply then contem-
porary philosophy to legal problems. We learn "Hart is one of the lead-
ing proponents of what is sometimes called 'linguistic analysis' or 'ordi-
nary language philosophy.' "10 To celebrate his status we next rapidly
tour the work of some philosophers who influenced Hart including Aus-
tin, Ryle, and late Wittgenstein. MacCormick writes lightly: "A fa-
mous text illustrating this approach is . . . ."; "An even more in-
fluencial colleague of Hart's was ... "; "Among the questions raised
by . . . ,.
I am not going to address what was new about Hart's jurispru-
dence.12 Neither it nor the ordinary language philosophy on which it is
parasitic is now new. Ordinary language philosophy is an episode in the
history of philosophy. Ordinary language philosophers, like other phi-
losophers having strongly defined commitments, have thought of earlier
philosphers as imperfect precursors: "[T]he Analysts of Oxford have
succeeded to their own satisfaction in reading the [Platonic] dialogues
that they call 'critical' as primitive essays in their own philosophical
method."1 3 Both Platonic and contemporary philosophy differ from phi-
losophy thirty years ago, although the latter difference is largely un-
reflected in legal philosophy. I will examine the lecture that put Hart in
controversy in terms of philosophy today.
9. Id. at 3.
10. Id. at 13.
11. Id. at 13, 14, 16.
12. Compare Hart, Symposium: Is There Knowledge by Acquaintance?, in 23 POLITICS, PSY-
CLOLOGY AND ART 69 (Aristotelian Soe'y Supp. vol. 23, 1949), with Findlay, id. at 111. See B.
MAGEE, The Philosophy of Language: Dialogue with John Searle, in MEN OF IDEAS 194-95
(1978).
13. H. CHERNISS, The Relation of the Timaeus to Plato's Later Dialogues, in SELECTED PA-
PERS 307 (L. Ttran ed. 1977).
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Basically, Definition and Theory discusses legal objects such as
rights and corporations and decides that there are not any. Then the
lecture tries to explain what the word 'right', for instance, is doing in
sentences like:
Jones has the right.
The right may be any right, for example, the right of free exercise or
the right to be paid ten dollars by Smith. I use this sentence as a para-
digm, although as a piece of actual legal discourse it is schematic. I
will use 'Jones has the cow' as a corresponding paradigmatic sentence
from ordinary language. In 'Jones has the cow', I intend 'has' to be a
physical predicate in the neighborhood of 'has his arm around the neck
of', or 'has control over'. I do not intend it to be equivalent to 'owns' or
'has the ownership of'. I get the name of a piece of language by put-
ting it in single quotation marks: 'cow'.
(Thesis) It used to be said (mostly by Germans) that we can do
serious philosophy only in ancient Greek or modern German. 14 Ordi-
nary language philosophy relates to Definition and Theory less as its
methodology than as a vehicle, like German, for its ideas: we can do
various philosophical things using it. Underlying Definition and Theory
is the idea that legal expressions such as 'the right' do not refer.
MacCormick teaches us to inspect Austin, Ryle, and Wittgenstein for
the origin of this idea. We find it in Ryle's Systematically Misleading
Expressions, which says that each of the misleading expressions it
identifies "is misconstrued as a denoting expression which in fact does
not denote, but only looks grammatically like expressions which are
used to denote." 5
I
(Truth) Hart says "[a] statement of the form 'X has a right' is
true if. .. ." Then he gives complicated truth conditions. 17 The pas-
sage is at the core of Definition and Theory. Apparently Hart thinks
that truth is a property of pieces of language and that he may explain
linguistic behavior in terms of it. That is, if he were asked, 'Why did
Jones say 'Rose is a cow'?', he would probably respond inter alia, 'Be-
14. M. GRENE, PHILOSOPHY IN AND OUT OF EUROPE 30 (1976).
15. Ryle, Systematically Misleading Expressions, in EssAYS ON LocC AND LANGUAGE 32
(A. Flew ed. 1951).




cause 'Rose is a cow' is true'.
(Reference: ordinary language) Hart says that 'right' does "not
have the straightforward connection with counterparts in the world of
fact which most ordinary words have."' 8 The straightforward connec-
tion is reference. For Hart, most ordinary words refer to things. 'the
cow' in 'Jones has the cow' refers to a cow: Rose. The adjective
'straightforward' suggests reference is a transparent relation to Hart.
We understand pre-analytically what it is for the linquistic item 'the
cow' and the cow itself to be related by the first referring to the second.
(Reference: legal language) Hart says: "There is nothing that sim-
ply 'corresponds' to these legal words. . . ."1 Hart is contrasting ordi-
nary words like 'cow' with legal words like 'right'. Here Hart is saying
maybe no more than: if everything goes well, if Rose does not expire
unexpectedly, 'the cow' in 'Jones has the cow' refers to (stands for;
denotes) Rose, a physical object, a particular cow; but there is not a
bovine or equally evident entity for 'the right' to refer to.
Then Hart asks, if not exactly this plainly, 'What is the word
'right' doing there?'. We want to get the question correct; Hart advises
us that other philosophers get it wrong: They ask in the material mode,
'What is a right?'. They ask in the formal mode, 'What does the word
'right' mean?', read as, 'What does 'right' refer to?'. Hart says these
other philosophers assume rights exist, they assume 'right' refers. Then
they predictably answer their question in its material and formal ver-
sions by finding or making up something that 'right' refers to.
Hart says that an "older type of theory," 20 one "now unfashion-
able,"' 21 tells us "a right is an 'objective reality'-an invisible entity
existing apart from the behaviour of men."'22 A right is therefore like a
cow in all respects save that we cannot see it, feel it, hear it, or other-
wise sense it. It is hard to imagine what a right might be then. Inscru-
tability is a bad quality for a thing to have, but it is not necessarily an
insuperable handicap to it.
Hart, quoting Olivecrona, says that according to the Scandinavian
legal realists "a right is nothing real at all but an ideal or fictitious or
imaginary power."2 3 To other Scandinavian legal realists it is just noth-
18. Id. at 23.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 24.
21. Id. at 23 n.2.




ing at all.24 The older theory, that a right is an invisible entity, is philo-
sophically unsophisticated. The theory of the Scandinavian legal real-
ists is sophisticated but old-fashioned; it is the instrumentalism of the
logical positivists.
Hart also tells us the American legal realists thought "a right is a
term by which we describe the prophecies we make of the probable
behaviour of courts or officials." 25 They did; but Hart is probably
wrong to assume that, like the others, the American legal realists were
trying to discover what, if anything, 'right' refers to. In their view
'right' seems not itself to refer, but is used syncategorematically in a
sentence describing the prophecies.
The three kinds of responses are not peculiar to law but usual in
philosophy of science. In terms of distinctions drawn by Quinton:
American legal realists are reductionists; Scandinavian legal realists
are instrumentalists; the older analysts are philosophical realists. Then
exactly those philosophers who are not legal realists are realists in that
they believe in theoretical entities in law.
26
Hart does not wholly persuade us that the legal philosophical posi-
tions he rejects cannot be defended. He argues from the insight that
rights are not cows. But this insight does not establish that rights are
not other things, although it perhaps suggests this.
(Exercise) Holmes realized that legal theory is methodologically
closely connected to other scientific theory. He compared positing
rights with positing gravity:
So we prophesy that the earth and sun will act towards each
other in a certain way. Then as we pretend to account for that
mode of action by the hypothetical cause, the force of gravita-
tion, . .. we get up the empty substratum, a right, to pretend
to account for the fact that the courts will act in a certain
way. . . . I should like to write a first book of the law keeping
to hard fact and using no images.27
Holmes here is acting like an American legal realist/reductionist, pro-
24. See Ross, Tf,-t6, 70 HARV. L. REV. 812, 814 (1957); Wedberg, Some Problems In the
Logical Analysis of Legal Science, 17 THEORIA 246 (1951), reprinted in Co"resIeO RY PIIiLOs-
OPHY IN SCANDINAVIA 237 (R. Olson & A. Paul eds. 1972).
25. Definition and Theory. supra note 1, at 23-24.
26. A. QUINTON, THE NATURE OF THINGS 288-89 (1973).
27. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Frederick Pollock (Jan. 19. 1928), reprinted In 2
HOL iEs-POLLOCK LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLIES AND SIR FREDER-
ICK POLLOCK, 1874-1932, at 212-13 (M. Howe ed. 1941).
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spectively criticizing the legal analogue of the philosophical realist. Is it
perfectly clear that gravity or rights are fictitious?
MacCormick states: "Perhaps the gravest deficiency in Hart's
Concept of Law is the extent to which he gave his hand to perpetuating
the caricature picture of the realist teachings and concerns." 8 Accord-
ing to MacCormick, Hart goes wrong by interpreting the American
legal realists to believe-rather than merely say enthusiastically-that
law is not a set of rules but rather what judges do. By focusing on the
realist attitude toward legal entities, Definition and Theory omits other
aspects of realist thought-mostly empiricist. For example, Llewellyn
complained that Moore
"tested out" whether law has mystical operation by an elabo-
rate observation, metering and statisticking of the noneffect on
the parking practices of New Haveners of a change in the offi-
cial traffic regulations, which he had arranged to keep care-
fully from coming to the knowledge of any trafficker.2"
Llewellyn liked to overstate things. Anyway he thereby situated Moore
alongside those extreme empiricist psychologists studying perception of
color, who, as Waismann remarked to Wittgenstein, "believed so firmly
that this was a matter of empirical states of affairs that they even per-
formed empirical investigations whether two colours could not be at the
same place." 30 The American legal realists not only taught an ontology
but practiced an epistemology.
It will be important later that Hart's world of fact-the world
Hart says legal language problematically fails to refer into-approxi-
mates Sellars's manifest image, "the framework in terms of which man
came to be aware of himself as man-in-the-world." 31 This is the world
as we take it to be if we do not reflect on it. Sellars opposes the mani-
fest image to a scientific image, "derived from the fruits of postula-
tional theory construction. ' 32 The juxtaposed images suggest a legal
image, a world of law. But the manifest image will matter to us. Signif-
28. N. MACCORIICK, supra note 2, at 124 (discussing H.L.A. HART, CONCEPT OF LAW
(1961)).
29. Llewellyn, On What Makes Legal Research Worth While, 8 J. LEGAL EDUC. 399, 401
(1956).
30. WITTGENSTEIN AND THE VIENNA CIRCLE: CONVERSATIONS RECORDED BY FRIEDRICIH
WAISMANN 79 (B. McGuinness ed., J. Schulte & B. McGuinness trans. 1979).
31. W. SELLARS, Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man, in SCIENCE, PERCEPTION AND
REALITY 6 (1963).
32. Id. at 19.
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icantly, its source is an "original image" which posits persons as primi-
tive, that is, Sellars tells us, "originally, to be a tree was a way of being
a person."33
Frege (1848-1925) became important to contemporary philosophi-
cal thought beginning about 1950. English editions of his work-The
Foundations of Arithmetic34 [Foundations] and Translations from the
Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege35 [Translations]-were pub-
lished in 1950 and 1952. Hart perhaps read them before delivering
Definition and Theory. Hart's teacher and collegue, J.L. Austin, trans-
lated Foundations. We understand Hart better by attending to Frege
because they said related things.
Baker and Hacker translate Frege's term Bedeutung 'reference';
Long and White translate it 'meaning'. The former claim they "deviate
systematically from very recent translations"; 6 the latter say they
"have parted company with all previous English translators." 37 Assimi-
lating 'means' to 'refers to' was usual when Frege was first being trans-
lated. Despite what Long and White say, Foundations adopts 'mean-
ing' for Bedeutung; so too does the most recent edition of
Translations," although previous editions use 'reference'.30 With it
translated 'meaning', Frege says "[tihe meaning of a proper name is
the object itself which we designate by using it."' 4n If we begin examin-
ing Definition and Theory by reading 'meaning' as 'reference', we un-
derstand how Hart finds the meaning of 'right' problematic because he
thinks 'right' refers to nothing ordinary.
Hart could not have read Frege attentively. Hart appears to con-
fuse use and mention. While discussing the American legal realists, he
says, "a right is a term by which we describe .... 1"41 Here, either he
33. Id. at 10. Searle, in ordinary language philosophy, makes a similar distinction between
brute and institutional facts. See J. SEARLE, SPEECH ACTS 50-53 (1969).
34. G. FREGE, THE FOUNDATIONS OF ARITHMETIC (J. Austin trans. 2d rev. ed. 1968) (Ist ed.
Breslau 1884).
35. G. FREGE, TRANSLATIONS FROM THE PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF Gorrsnon FREGE (P.
Geach & M. Black eds. 1952) [hereinafter cited as TRAN sLATIONS].
36. G. BAKER & P. HACKER, FREGE: LOGICAL EXCAVATIONS at ix (1984).
37. Long & White, Translators' Preface to G. FREGE, POSTHUMOUS WRITINGS at vi (H. Her-
mes, F. Kambartel & F. Kaulbach eds., P. Long & R. White trans. 1979).
38. G. FREGE, On Sense and Meaning, in TRANSLATIONS FROM TIrE PHILOSOPHICAL WRIT-
INGS OF GOTrLOB FREGE 56 (P. Geach & M. Black eds., 3d ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as 1980
TRANSLATIONS].
39. G. FREGE, On Sense and Reference, in TRANSLATIONS, supra note 35, at 60.
40. G. FREGE, On Sense and Meaning, in 1980 TRANSLATIONS, supra note 38, at 60.
41. Definition and Theory, supra note 1, at 23-24.
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fails to recognize that he has stopped talking about rights and started
talking about 'right' or he is using 'term' obsoletely. Frege, in Transla-
tions, criticized equivocating this way forcefully enough to discourage a
reader from doing it. 2 As the next section demonstrates, if Hart knew
Foundations, he could hardly have written as he did without citing or
distinguishing it.
II
Hart says that expressions like 'the right' do not refer, and that we
must define or explain them contextually. We are going to examine
these propositions in the opposite order. An economist finds it easier to
think things up than to look them up and does not cite much. A lawyer
instead relies on precedent. Hart attributes these propositions to
Bentham. We must first ask what Hart adopts from Bentham; then if
Hart interprets Bentham correctly. Hart is an authority on Bentham,
having written "the most extensive and incisive discussion of the major
aspects of Bentham's general theory of law."4 a We expect Hart to get
Bentham right.
Hart begins: "Long ago Bentham issued a warning that legal
words demanded a special method of elucidation, and he enunciated a
principle that is the beginning of wisdom in this matter, though it is not
the end."'44 The passage has too many words and we might substitute:
'Bentham said'. According to Hart, what Bentham said is "we must
never take [legal] words alone, but consider whole sentences in which
they play their characteristic role."'45
Hart reads Bentham's warning/principle to be: Take not words
but sentences. The word 'take' abbreviates 'take as semantically primi-
tive'. Semantical primitives are the smallest units of meaning. A piece
of language is semantically primitive if taken together it has meaning
42. G. FREGE, Frege Against the Formalists, in TRANSLATIONS, supra note 35, at 193.
Hart, in confusing use and mention, is in good company (Russell's). See Quine, Introduction
to Russell, Mathematical Logic as Based on the Theory of Types, in FROM FREOn TO GODEL: A
SOURCE BOOK IN MATHEMATICAL LOGIC, 1879-1931, at 150-52 (J. van Heijenoort ed. 1967)
[hereinafter cited as FRoMi FREGE TO GODEL]. See also Letter from Gottlob Frege to Philip E.B.
Jourdain (Jan. 28, 1914), reprinted in G. FREGE, PHILOSOPHICAL AND MATHEMATICAL CORRE-
SPONDENCE 81-84 (G. Gabriel, H. Hermes, F. Kambartcl, C. Thiel & A. Vcraart eds., abr. by B.
McGuinness, H. Kaal trans. 1980).
43. Raz, Hart on Moral Rights and Legal Duties, 4 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 123, 123 (1984)
(referring to H.L.A. HART, ESSAYS ON BENTHAM: STUDIES IN JURISPRUDENCE AND POLITICAL
THEORY (1982) (hereinafter cited as ESSAYS ON BENTHAM]).




but no proper part of it has meaning. The principle applied to the par-
ticular jurisprudential context directs that we "take not the word 'right'
but the sentence 'You have a right'."46 According to Hart, then, legal
sentences-not parts of them-are semantically primitive. Anyway,
this is the way things look so far.
Quine celebrates the "idea of defining a symbol in use" as "an
advance over the impossible term-by-term empiricism of Locke and
Hume. ' 47 He cites Bentham as the source of the advance, saying "[t]he
statement, rather than the term, came with Bentham to be recognized
as the unit accountable to an empiricist critique."48 Quine says we
should not stop at the statement; "even in taking the statement as unit
we have drawn our grid too finely," since "[t]he unit of empirical sig-
nificance is the whole of science." 49 Quine's warning/principle, there-
fore, is: Take not sentences but languages. Languages of course cannot
be the smallest units of meaning or else we could not say anything
meaningful briefly. Therefore, 'take' here does not mean 'take as se-
mantically primitive' as it does in Definition and Theory.
We must find the minimal properties of Bentham's principle to
separate what belongs to him from what properly belongs to Hart or
Quine. Bentham thought that legal words could not be defined, but he
did not think they had then just to sit there uninterpreted. He called
the operation on them that is the surrogate for defining 'paraphrasis'.
Quine and Hart think rightly that, using paraphrasis, "we need only
show, by whatever means, how to translate all the whole sentences in
which the term is to be used." 50 They are right: we need not show more
than this. However, we need not show even this much. Bentham more
typically or fundamentally spoke of paraphrasis operating subsenten-
tially. He said it "consists in taking the word that requires to be ex-
pounded"; "making it up into a phrase"; then interpreting the phrase."1
More explicitly, Bentham said: "In a definition, a phrase is employed
for the exposition of a single word: in a paraphrasis, a phrase is em-
ployed for the exposition of an entire phrase .... 152 Therefore, Ben-
46. Id.




50. Quine, Epistemology Naturalized, in ONTOLOGICAL RELATIvrrY AND OTlHER EsAs 72
(1969).




tham's actual warning/principle was: Take not words but phrases. Hart
recognizes that Bentham was "giving phrase for phrase, not word for
word,"5 but rejects or seems to reject doing this in favor of giving
sentence for sentence.
Hart instructs us that "the primary function" of 'right' "is not to
stand for or describe anything,""4 but he does not identify a secondary
referential or other function. That legal words do not refer is why we
cannot define them but must paraphrase them. We tentatively interpret
Hart to say: Proper parts of legal sentences are meaningless; they do
not refer. According to Hart, it is lack of reference that "makes it vital
to attend to Bentham's warning that we should not. . . abstract words
like 'right' . . . from the sentences in which alone their full function
can be seen, and then demand of them so abstracted their genus and
differentia. ' 55 The model by which we define, 'cow: A big mammal that
says 'moo' ', does not work for rights. Nothing exists that is plausibly a
right and comparable to a cow.
Hart finds authority in Bentham for this proposition about refer-
ence. Bentham remarked that it would be just as futile to define the
preposition 'through' by 'A through is a that '. Bentham was
talking not just about legal language but also about names of fictitious
entities generally. Concrete particulars, "this man, this beast, this bird,
this fish, this star," and kinds, that is, classes of concrete particulars,
were the only entities not fictitious for Bentham.5 6 So Bentham said:
Names of fictitious entities are meaningless; they do not refer.
Bentham was being broader than Hart by talking about legal and non-
legal language. But Bentham talked about names whereas (tentatively)
we have Hart talking about all subsentential linguistic items.
Bentham also said, a man's right to a thing is "the relation a man
is in with respect to a thing."57 It looks like Bentham is defining 'right'
per genus et differentiam: a right is the relation (genus) a man is in
with respect to a thing (differentia). We ought not be greatly unsettled
by his having done this. Hart says Bentham published "very nearly
6,000,000 words,"58 so he must have said most things once. We today
53. Definition and Theory, supra note 1, at 34.
54. Id. at 31.
55. Id.
56. C. OGDEN, supra note 51, at 139.
57. J. BENTHAM, A Comment on the Commentaries or An Introduction to the Introductions,
in A COMMENT ON THE COMMENTARIES AND A FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT 87 (J. Burns &
H.L.A. Hart eds. 1977) (1st ed. London 1776).
58. H.L.A. HART, Bentham and Beccaria, in ESSAYS ON BENTHAM, supra note 43, at 41.
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prestigiously interpret apparent names of philosophical entities as refer-
ring to properties or relations. Montague thus defined pains, tasks,
events, obligations, etc.59
In Foundations, Frege gave his own "fundamental principle" four
times.60 His third version was: "Nur im Zusammenhange eines Satzes
bedeuten die W6rter etwas."6' ("It is only in the context of a sentence
that words have any meaning."6 ) Definition and Theory did not distin-
guish or cite any passage from Foundations. But Hart quotes this third
version in the introduction to his recent Essays on Bentham. He does
so in the context of his review of good things, "things of great specula-
tive importance," that Bentham says. 3 One good thing is that
"sentences not words are the unit of meaning."6 According to Hart,
this idea "was not to appear again in philosophy for fifty years," when
it was "asserted by Frege and stressed in Wittgenstein's Tractatus
Logico-Philosophicus.
' 65
In informal conversation, where logical precision is not important,
Frege said, "it is not at all necessary that the individual words should
have a sense and meaning of their own, provided only that the whole
proposition has a sense." 66 But reference is required for inference. Thus
Frege said that in scientific discourse, "[w]here inferences are to be
drawn,. . . it is essential that the same expression should occur in two
propositions and should have exactly the same meaning in both
cases."67 Frege believed that jurisprudence is like mathematics, and
mathematics Frege characterized as being more entirely about infer-
ence than is anything else."" Law then is plausibly scientific discourse
in Frege's sense.
59. See R. MONTAGUE, On the Nature of Certain Philosophical Entitles, in FoRtAL PuILOS-
OPHY: SELECTED PAPERS OF RICHARD MONTAGUE 148 (R. Thomason ed. 1974), reprintedfrom
53 MONtST 159 (1960).
60. See G. FREGE, supra note 34, at xe, 71e, 73e, 116e.
61. Id. at 73e.
62. G. BAKER & P. HACKER, supra note 36, at 202.
63. H.L.A. HART, Introduction, in ESSAYS ON BENTHAMn, supra note 43. at 10.
64. Id.
65. Id. (footnotes omitted). The interpretation is generally conceded. See Diamond, What
Nonsense Might Be, 56 PHILOSOPHY 5, 17-18 (1981); Dummett, The Significance of Qulne's
Indeterminacy Thesis, 27 SYNTHESE 351, 359 (1974). See also M. DuMIMETr, THE INTERPRETA-
TION OF FREGE'S PHILOSOPHY 360-427 (1981).
66. Letter from Gottlob Frege to Giuseppe Peano (Sept. 29, 1896), reprinted In G. FREGF,
PHILOSOPHICAL AND MATHEMATICAL CORRESPONDENCE. supra note 42, at 115.
67. Id. See M. RESNIK, FREGE AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF MATITIcATcS 161-71 (1980); Bell,
The Place of the Grundlagen in Frege's Development, 31 PHIL Q. 209 (1981).
68. G. FREGE, Logic in Mathematics, in POSTHUMOUS WRITINGS, supra note 37, at 203.
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Hart evidently thinks Frege is saying the same thing Hart is; how-
ever, Frege is not. Corresponding to Hart's question, 'What is 'right'
doing there?', Frege asked, 'what is '37' doing there?'. Hart would re-
spond: 'Anyway, not referring to a number'. For Hart, numbers would
be like rights, unbovine and indistinct. But Frege was certain numerals
refer and investigated what they refer to. The difference is between
Frege's taking words to refer but inspecting sentences to find out what
they refer to, and Hart's taking words not to refer at all.
Listen to Frege, sounding outraged as if he had already read Hart.
"I find it extraordinary some linguists have recently viewed a
'Satzwort' (sentence-word), a word expressing a whole judgement, as
the primitive form of speech and ascribe no independent existence to
the roots, as mere abstractions."69 The adjective 'primitive' abbreviates
'semantically primitive'. Frege was outraged because he said true
things but nobody listened.
For Hart, 'the right' in 'Jones has the right' functions as does 'in'
in 'bovine'. If we do not attend to his purpose we might mistakenly
interpret the language of Definition and Theory so that it accords with
Frege's. We read Hart correctly by seeing that Frege's principle does
not help Hart explain 'the right'. If terms such as 'the right' get their
referents from the sentences they are embedded in, then the referents
would be rights. But it is Hart's idea that there are not rights, so 'the
right' must not refer at all.
Wittgenstein's principle went: "Nur der Satz hat Sinn; nur im
Zusammenhange des Satzes hat ein Name Bedeutung." ("Only pro-
positions have sense; only in the nexus of a proposition does a name
have meaning. '7 0 ) In the Tractatus, which is what Hart is citing,
Wittgenstein just repeated Frege's principle. 1
III
Frege was really happy about the idea of reference. Ordinarily the
most important thing we can say about a name is what it refers to,
while the most important thing we can say about a sentence is whether
it is true or false. But Frege used the idea of reference to talk about
sentential truth too, assimilating sentence meaning to name meaning.
69. G. FREGE, Boole's Logical Calculus and the Concept-script, in POSTHUMOUS WRITINGS,
supra note 37, at 17 n.**.
70. L. WITTGENSTEIN, TRACTATUS LoGICO-PHILOSOPHICUS § 3.3 (D. Pears & B. McGuinness
trans. 1961).
71. G. BAKER & P. HACKER, supra note 36, at 199.
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Frege said: "All true propositions have the same meaning: the true; and
all false propositions have the same meaning: the false."7 2 Here 'pro-
position' translates Satz but 'sentence' would do better. Explaining sen-
tence meaning using reference requires not merely confidence in refer-
ence but also comfort in the company of abstract entities-the True
and the False. Hart and Bentham achieved confidence not comfort. It
is said, maybe on bad evidence, that Frege thought discovering the
True and the False is pretty much like discovering "two new chemical
elements. 173 But not everybody thinks this way.
Hart applauds Bentham's getting rid of rights, but Hart and Ben-
tham part company over what is left. Bentham said there need be no
legal language. We may reduce legal language to ordinary language;
we "find a translation of it into what we should call factual terms."'74
Hart, in contrast, says there must be legal sentences. These sentences
persist, having a right is not just the possibility of a pattern of physical
objects. A right's content is not exhausted by locking up somebody who
does not perform the duty correlated with that right. But words like
'fight' are not names of legal entities. Nevertheless, Hart likes some of
the things Bentham says: "These, though defective, are on the right
lines. They are not paraphrases but they specify some of the conditions
necessary for the truth of a sentence of the form 'You have a right'."
'
Hart is providing a theory of meaning of legal language that we
may interpret as a theory of truth. Preeminently, Davidson interprets a
theory of meaning as a theory of truth. Davidson's philosophy is
superfically antithetical to Hart's ordinary language philosophy, born
at Oxford. The Philosophical Lexicon defines 'davidsonic boom' as
"the sound made by a research program when it hits Oxford."701 David-
son's research program is disapproved even by Oxford philosophers
such as Ayer, who are not wholly sympathetic to ordinary language
philosophy. "Semantics rules the roost," Ayer complains. "The younger
philosophers, seduced by Donald Davidson, devote their energy. . . to
the Sisyphean task of teasing a theory of meaning out of Tarsli's the-
ory of truth. 17 7 Nevertheless, Ayer ill-humoredly indicates the signifi-
cance of this part of Davidson's program. I will talk about Tarski
72. Letter from Gottlob Frege to Bertrand Russell (Oct. 20, 1902), reprinted in G. FrtEGF,
PHILOSOPHICAL AND MATHEMATICAL CORRESPONDENCE, supra note 42. at 149.
73. G. BAKER & P. HACKER, supra note 36, at 17.
74. Definition and Theory, supra note I, at 34.
75. Id.
76. THE PHILOSOPHICAL LEXICON 3 (D. Dennett & K. Lambert eds. 1978).




Watch how Davidson does it.7 8 We let 's' name a sentence and 'm'
name its meaning. Then we write 's means m'. That is, "Jones has a
right' means '. Frege would put either 'the True' or 'the False' in
the blank. There are two troubles with Frege's approach. First, all
sentences could then only mean one of two things. 'Snow is white'
means the same thing as 'Grass is green', that is, the True. Second, the
meanings are themselves obscure. Instead we should write ''Jones has
a right' means that Jones has a right'. We may parse this so that 'that
Jones has a right' replaces 'm'. That Jones has a right is a proposition.
This eliminates the first trouble, because there being many proposi-
tions, sentences can mean many things. What is causing the trouble
now is that the form 's means m' requires us to speak in terms of a
relation between a sentence and a proposition, most likely obscure. We
could write 's means that p', p being the sentence named. Thus, ''Jones
has a right' means that Jones has a right'. Referring is not a trouble if
we thus divide the sentence between 'that' and 'Jones', not between
'means' and 'that', because by doing this we dispose of 'that Jones has
a right', the linguistic entity that seems to refer. The expression 'means
that' is obscure. We keep the structure 's _ p', but replace 'means
that' by 'is T if and only if '. Thus, we obtain ''Jones has a right' is T
if and only if Jones has a right'.
According to Davidson, the sentences like ''Jones has a right' is T
if and only if Jones has a right' should be consequences of a theory of
meaning. But it does not need to have other consequences. A predicate
is a linguistic function taking lists of names or descriptions as argu-
ments, returning sentences as values. The predicate 'is feminine' taken
'70at the argument 'the cow' returns the value 'The cow is feminine'.
Davidson says 'is 7 (equivalently: 'x is T'; ' is T'80) is the truth
predicate. Thus, truth is the property that 'The cow is feminine' has if
and only if the cow is feminine. If we know the truth conditions of a
sentence we know all there is to know about its meaning. For Davidson,
a theory of meaning is a theory of truth.
The condition we want to put on the truth predicate is that which
78. Davidson, Truth and Meaning, in PHILOSOPHICAL LOGIC 1 (J. Davis, D. Hockney & W.
Wilson eds. 1969).
79. 1 A. ANDERSON & N. BELNAP, ENTAILMENT: THE LOGIC OF RELEVANCE AND NECESSITY
473-92 (1975). About the femininity of cows, consider Mydans, Promotors Are Bullish Over
Cows, N.Y. Times, Nov. 23, 1983, at B3, col. 1 (morning ed.).




Tarski imposed on the symbol 'Tr'. Tarski directed:
A formally correct definition of the symbol 'Tr.. .will be
called an adequate definition of truth if it has the following
consequences:
(a) all sentences which are obtained from the expression
'x E Tr if and only if p' by substituting for the symbol 'x' a
structural-descriptive name of any sentence of the language in
question and for the symbol 'p' the expression which forms the
translation of this sentence into the metalanguage. .... "I
Read 'e Tr" as 'is true' or as 'belongs to the class of true sentences'.
A metalanguage is what we talk in about an object language. "Jones
has a cow' is true' is a metalinguistic sentence containing an object
language sentence. We have been getting structural-descriptive names
by putting pieces of language in single quotation marks. Tarski's condi-
tion looks trivial but is not because theories of truth must generate the
infinitely many biconditionals required by it.
Davidson puts the same condition on a theory of meaning that
Tarski puts on a theory of truth. We imagine that Hart agrees with
Davidson that the idea of meaning is obscure, nevertheless the idea of
truth is sufficiently clear to interpret meaning in terms of it.
IV
In parts I-III, I have chronicled good things Hart does. Basically,
there are two good things. First, Hart investigates sentences, not iso-
lated words, to obtain meanings (approved qualifiedly by Bentham,
Quine, and Frege). Second, Hart interprets meaning by truth (ap-
proved by Davidson). But doing these things together generates diffi-
culty for Hart.
We obtain a legal language by augmenting ordinary English with
technical legal terms like 'right'. If we break compounds like 'thirty-
seven' into their components, the language has only finitely many
words; the Oxford English Dictionary is big, but it ends. Nevertheless,
the number of sentences is not finite. An illustration by Hart suggests
this infinite sequence of sentences: 'Jones has a right'; 'The friend of
Jones has a right'; 'The friend of the friend of Jones has a right'; and so
on.
A legal language or other natural language is learnable. We may
81. A. TARSKI, The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages, in Looic, Suuwncs,
METAMATHEMATICS 187-88 (J. Woodger trans. 2d ed. 1969) (cmphasis altered).
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look up words we do not know. Because there are only finitely many
words, we can look all or at least any of them up. We cannot look up
sentences. Ordinarily, we do not confront a sentence more than once.
But usually we know what it means if we know what its words mean.
Most of the sentences in this paper are intelligible, but few besides
those quoted have been produced before.
Frege also recognized this phenomenon. He said that "even a
thought grasped by a human being for the very first time can be put
into a form of words which will be understood by someone to whom the
thought is entirely new." 82 One for whom this thought is new under-
stands it because he or she is "able to distinguish parts in the thought
corresponding to the parts of a sentence." 83 Consequently "construction
of the sentence out of parts of a sentence corresponds to the construc-
tion of a thought out of parts of a thought. 84
A theory of meaning for a learnable language ought to manifest
its finite or recursive character. Otherwise, the theory is disassociated
from practice. The following theories do not manifest this character:
(1) Quotation marks make structureless names of pieces of language
from these pieces. For example, ' 'Jones has a right'' is a structureless
name of 'Jones has a right'. Therefore quotations are semantical primi-
tives. (2) Sentences like 'Smith believes that Jones has a right' consist
of a name and a predicate: 'Smith' and 'x believes that Jones has a
right' respectively. The names and the predicates are semantically
primitive. Theories (1) and (2) are not adequate because they provide
infinitely many semantical primitives. There are infinitely many pieces
of language to be quoted and things to be believed.",
The difficulty then is that Definition and Theory does not let legal
sentences have parts. For Hart, sentences containing legal terms are
semantically primitive. 'Jones has a right' means something, 'Smith has
a right' means something else, unrelated for all we can tell. Infinitely
many sentences contain legal terms ('Jones has a right', 'The friend of
Jones has a right', 'The friend of the friend of Jones has a right', etc.);
therefore a legal language has infinitely many semantical primitives
and is unlearnable. Or at least the theory of it does not display how we
may learn it and thus this theory is inadequate by Davidson's test. It
82. Frege, Compound Thoughts, 72 MIND 1, 1 (1963).
83. Id.
84. G. FREGE, Logic in Mathematics, in POSTHUMOUS WRITINGS, supra note 37, at 225.
85. Davidson, Theories of Meaning and Learnable Languages, in LocIC, MErnODOLOaY AND
PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 383 (Y. Bar-Hillel ed. 1965).
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"actually postulates each sentence," as Kripke complains about some-
body else's theory; such a theory is "precisely the bUte noire of the
Davidsonian approach.""6
Definition and Theory gets out of this difficulty by not having been
talking about sentences all along. To generate the sentences his ade-
quacy condition requires, Tarski talked of "satisfaction of a given sen-
tential function by given objects."87 Read 'predicate' for 'sentential
function'. Objects are things like cows. Satisfaction is the relation a
cow (Rose) bears to the predicate 'is feminine' if Rose is feminine. But
we will let Tarski tell it. Tarski's "simplest and clearest case" of satis-
faction is that where "the given sentential function contains only one
free variable"; 8  in this case we can "significantly say of every single
object that it does or does not satisfy the given function."89 Tarski
continued
In order to explain the sense of this phrase we consider the
following scheme:
for all a, a satisfies the sentential function x if and only if
P
and substitute in this scheme for 'p' the given sentential
function (after first replacing the free variable occurring
in it by 'a') and for 'x' some individual name of this
function.90
Substituting as Tarski requested, we obtain, 'For all a, a satisfies the
sentential function 'x is feminine' if and only if a is feminine'. Tarski
illustrates:
Within colloquial language, we can in this way obtain, for ex-
ample, the following formulation:
for every a, we have a satisfies the sentential function 'x
is white' if and only if a is white
(and from this conclude, in particular, that snow satisfies the
function 'x is white')."1
86. Kripke, Is There a Problem About Substitutional Quantification?, in TRUtM AND MEAN-
ING 340 (G. Evans & J. McDowell eds. 1976).
87. A. TARSKI, supra note 81, at 189.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 190 (footnotes omitted).
90. Id. (emphasis altered).
91. Id. (emphasis altered).
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Return now to Hart, climaxing and concluding his talk of 'right'.
Hart says:
I would, therefore, tender the following as an elucidation
of the expression "a legal right": (1) A statement of the form
"X has a right" is true if the following conditions are satisfied:
(a) There is in existence a legal system.
(b) Under a rule or rules of the system some other person
Y is, in the events which have happened, obliged to do or
abstain from some action.
(c) This obligation is made by law dependent on the
choice either of X or some other person authorized to act
on his behalf so that either Y is bound to do or abstain
from some action only if X (or some authorized person)
so chooses or alternatively only until X (or such person)
chooses otherwise. (2) .... 92
It is difficult to read conditions (a)-(c) attentively, so disregard
them for now. What matters is that Hart does exactly what Tarski
does. Hart talks as if sentences like 'Jones has a right' are semantical
primitives. Then it should be only these he may assign meanings to
individually. But 'X has a right', to which Hart assigns a meaning
when he gets down to business, is not a sentence but a predicate-the
kind of thing Tarski called a 'sentential function'. 'X' merely identifies
where in the predicate we may insert a name or other term to get a
sentence: 'x' or ' ' (just a space) do equally well. Or we may just
write the predicate without indicating where we want a name. Frege
told us in Translations, talking about predicates of numbers, that 'x'
"only serves to keep places open for a numerical symbol to be put in
and complete the expression; ... it enables us to recognize the...
need for completion. . . ."3 Because Hart is attributing structure to
sentences, he is not taking the sentences as semantical primitives.
What are Hart's semantical primitives? Names ('Jones' etc.), of
course, understood to include definite descriptions ('the cow'), and
92. Definition and Theory, supra note 1, at 35.
93. G. FREGE, Translation of Parts of Frege's Grundgesetze der Arithmetik, in 1980 TRANS-
LATIoNs, supra note 38, at 132. See generally M. DUMMErT, FREGE: PHILOSOPt1Y OF LANGUAGE
8-33 (1973).
"For Frege a function is something incomplete, 'unsaturated.' When it is written fAx), x is
something extraneous that merely serves to indicate the kind of supplementation that is needed;
we might just as well write .__)." van Heijenoort, Introduction to Frege, Letter to Russell, in
FROM FREGE TO GODEL, supra note 42, at 126.
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predicates ('x has a right'), as we have just found out. We may gener-
ate an infinite sequence of sentences 'Jones has a right', . . ., 'The
friend of. . the friend of Jones has a right', . . ,with
name: Jones
predicate: x has a right
operator: the friend of x
An operator is a linguistic function taking lists of terms as arguments
and giving back terms as values.Y We reiterate the operator.
V
The scholarly contribution of Definition and Theory resides in how
Hart parses 'Jones has a/the right'. We write 'Jones has a cow'
perspicuously,
(1) 3x (x is a cow & Jones has x).
Read (1) as 'There is an x such that x is a cow and Jones has x', or
'There is something that is a cow and Jones has it'.
(2) 3x (x is a person & x has Rose).
Read (2) as 'There is an x such that x is a person and x has Rose', or
'Somebody has Rose'. ' 3x' is a quantifier binding the individual vari-
able 'x'. From 'Jones has (the cow) Rose' we may infer both (1) and
(2). The predicate of 'Jones has a cow' is a two-place predicate:
has '. It is relating a person to a thing.
The semantic realist sees the idea underlying Definition and The-
ory as that we cannot write 'Jones has a right' in a form paralleling
(1). From 'Jones has the right', for example, the right of free exercise,
we can infer only
(3) 3x (x is a person & x has a right)
that is, not
(4) 3x (x is a right & Jones has x).
Thus, the predicate of 'Jones has the right' is a one-place predicate:
• has the right'.
That 'Jones has a right' seems to share the predicate' has
with 'Jones has a cow' results from a grammatical misunderstanding.
We must take the words of '___ has a right' together. Also 'the right'
94. See I A. ANDtSON & N. BEtN., supra note 79, at 473-92.
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in 'Jones has the right' is merely a syncategorematic fragment of the
predicate ' has the right'. In this it is no different from the letters
'in' in 'bovine'; the letters do not themselves constitute a word but are
only part of one. A legal language, including Hart's, has infinitely
many sentences but is learnable because it has only finitely many predi-
cates. We do things like make contracts and commit torts, but there0
are not many kinds of ostensible legal things.
Talk of specific legal things is probably adverbial. Adverbs might
as well be functions from predicates to predicates. Paradigmatically:
quickly', in 'Spot runs quickly', is an adverb taking the predicate
4 runs' into the predicate ' runs quickly'. We get a sentence by
putting 'Spot' in the blank. Inspect Justice Douglas's discovery in Gris-
wold v. Connecticut, which I, with some license, will simplify to 'Jones
has the right that Jones is let alone'.9 5 The adverb ' that Jones is let
alone' takes the predicate ' has the right' into has the right
that Jones is let alone'. We get a sentence from this predicate by add-
ing the argument 'Jones'.
We may also make this point by talking directly about ontological
commitment: what we take there to be by speaking as we do. Quine
tells us that "a given theory or form of discourse . . . is committed to
those and only those entities to which the bound variables of the theory
must be capable of referring in order that the affirmations made in the
theory be true."96 Quine also says less ponderously that "[t]o be as-
sumed as an entity is, purely and simply, to be reckoned as the value of
a variable. ' 7 We have been using '=x' to bind variables. For instance
'3x (x is a person)' commits us to persons. A legal theory will ordi-
narily contain something equivalent to 'Jones has a right'. The idea of
Definition and Theory is that because we cannot infer '3x (x is a
right and Jones has x)' from 'Jones has a right', we are not onotologi-
cally committed to rights.
Hart's move is ordinary in nonlegal philosophy. Frege made it by
not reading 'The number of men who . ..is five' as predicating the
relation of identity of two numbers.9 8 Using 'q as a place-holder for a
one-place predicate and 'R' as a place-holder for a relation word, Sel-
lars, explaining mental predicates, similarly says "'Jones has an im-
95. 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965).
96. W. QUINE, On What There Is, in FROM A LOGICAL POINT OF ViEw, supra note 47, at 13-
14.
97. Id. at 13.
98. M. RESNIK, supra note 67, at 193.
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pression' has the form '4Jones' rather than 'Jones R x'," exactly as
"'Jones wore a smile' has the form '( Jones' rather than 'Jones R
x'."99 Evidently "persons who smile, but not their smiles," are
"particulars. '10 0
Predicates, if they refer, refer to properties. We may understand
properties most simply as sets. They are at least that. If 'x has a right'
refers, it refers to the property of having a right. Therefore, it refers to
the set of entities that have rights-the set of persons. If trees have
rights they are persons. A first-order language contains only variables
ranging over individuals like cows and persons. A second-order lan-
guage contains variables ranging over properties as well as individuals.
Properties, even as sets, are problematic and we want to avoid commit-
ting ourselves to them. 'Jones has a right' as part of a first-order lan-
guage does not commit us to the property of having a right. Just as we
cannot infer '3 (x is a right and 'Jones' has x)' from 'Jones has a right',
we can not infer
(5) 3F (Jones F)
from it. Read (5) as 'There is a property Jones has'. Here 'F' is a
predicate variable.
Recall from Part II that Bentham defined a man's right to (prop-
erty right in) a thing per genus et differentiam as a relation between
the man and the thing. Bentham was talking in the material mode (os-
tensibly about extralinguistic things). But saying something is a rela-
tion is equivalent to saying in the formal mode (about language) that
the piece of language that seems to name the relation is a predicate
with at least two places. Bentham was characterizing the predicate of a
sentence like 'Jones has a right to Rose' not as a three-place predicate,
___ has __ to ___', but as a two-place predicate, ' has a right to
'.Returning to the material mode we should read Bentham to have
said that the owning relation is between a person and a thing not
among a person and two things.
'Jones has a right' commits us only to persons, not to rights, or
havings of rights, because variables do not range over rights, or, in a
first-order language, havings. We must begin somewhere; and ordinary
language commits us, in Quine's sense, to some things. But if we begin
with Sellars's manifest image mentioned in Part I-which Sellars con-
99. Sellars, Rejoinder, in INTENTIONALITY, MINDS, AND PERCEPTION: DLSCUSsIONS ON COV-
TEMPORARY PmLosoPmy 286 (H. Castafleda ed. 1967).
100. Id. at 288.
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siders a sort of "groundfloor observation language"101-we have al-
ready committed ourselves to persons. As Hart interprets legal lan-
guage it does not commit us to entities other than the entities ordinary
language commits us to.
VI
Hart said, "A statement of the form 'X has a right' is true if the
following conditions are satisfied . . .. , Truth figures inessentially
in Hart's theory. We start to see this by attending to oddities in his
coming to deploy ' is true'. Hart disparages Bentham's program of
paraphrasing expressions like ' has a right'. Then a page later he
sets out his own truth conditions. The expository pace of Definition and
Theory elsewhere is not this fast.
I will inspect Hart's shift from paraphrasing to giving truth condi-
tions. Its terminus a quo is in Bentham's teaching and is suspect. Hart
attributes the insight that we ought to explain 'means' by 'true' to Ben-
tham. He quotes just two passages by Bentham representative of
passages "not paraphrases" that instead "specify some of the conditions
necessary for the truth of a sentence of the form 'You have a right'."103
Bentham said: "What you have a right to have me made do, is that
which I am liable according to law upon a requisition made on your
behalf to be punished for not doing. '04 He also said: "To know how to
expound a right carry your eye to the act which in the circumstances in
question would be a violation of that right; the law creates the right by
forbidding that act."' 0 5
The quoted passages are (contain, specify) paraphrases. They go
approximately ''The law will punish you if you do not do ' para-
phrases 'I have the right to make you do _ ''. The form is ''p' para-
phrases 'q' '. But it is obscured because Bentham used the material
mode not the formal mode. Going between the two modes is going, for
instance, from 'Cows are things' to ''cow' is a common noun'. As 'true'
does not appear in the quoted passages, they gie truth conditions im-
plicitly if at all. We recognize that paraphrasing is defining (away). If
paraphrasing is successful, the definiens ('The law will punish . . .')
and the definiendum ('I have a right . . .') have the same truth condi-
101. Sellars, Reply to Alan Donagan, 27 PHIL. STUD. 149, 181 (1975).
102. Definition and Theory, supra note 1, at 35.





tions. 'p' paraphrases 'q' if and only if 'p' and 'q' are true and false
concurrently. 'Rose has a fine leg' does not adequately paraphrase
'Rose is feminine' because the first may be true while the second is
false; e.g., if Rose has a fine leg but a bull-like countenance. Then ''p'
is true if and only if 'q' is true' says roughly what 'q' paraphrases 'p''
says. The redundancy theory of truth, to the effect that saying some-
thing is true is the same thing as saying it, licenses replacing "q' is
true' to the right of 'if and only if' by 'q' to get ''p' is true if and only
if q'.108 Bentham's sentence:
• . . paraphrases 'I have the right to make you do
and Hart's sentence:
'I have the right to make you do 'is true if and only if...
say pretty much or exactly the same thing. Paraphrasing and giving
truth conditions are alike so the termini are close together.
The terminus ad quem of the shift from paraphrasing to giving
truth and conditions is also unsettling. When I quoted Hart's truth con-
ditions I omitted what Hart puts after them but signalled he puts
something. Thus we quoted, "(1) A statement of the form 'X has a
right' is true" etc.; however, we stopped with "(2) . . . ." leaving the
analysis uncompleted. The omitted part gives us an idea of what Hart
is doing now: ". . . A statement of the form 'X has a right' is used to
draw a conclusion of law in a particular case which falls under such
rules. 10 7 This condition is not obviously about truth.
Frege, in section three of Begriffsschrift, said that what he called
the 'conceptual content of judgments' is what 'the Greeks defeated the
Persians at Plataea' and 'the Persians were defeated by the Greeks at
Plataea' share.108 Substitute 'meaning' for 'conceptual content' and 'as-
serted sentence' for 'judgment'. Frege said judgments have the same
conceptual contents (asserted sentences have the same meanings) if and
only if "all inferences that can be drawn from the first judgment when
combined with certain other ones can always also be drawn from the
second when combined with the same other judgments."100 We may
restate this, 'Sentences mean the same thing if and only if they license
106. F. RAMSEY, Facts and Propositions, in FOUNDATIONS: ESSAYS IN PILOSOPHY, LoGic,
MATHEMATICS AND EcONOMIcs 44-45 (D. Mellor ed. 1978).
107. Definition and Theory, supra note 1, at 35.
108. G. FREGE, Begriffsschrift: a formalized Language of pure Thought modelled upon the
Language of Arithmetic, in TRANSLATIONS, supra note 35, at 3.
109. Id. at 2-3. See Brandorn, Asserting, 17 NoOs 637 (1983).
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the same inferences'. Conceptual contents mattered to Frege. The
Begriffsschrift says that in its "formalized language. . . only that part
of judgments which affects the possible inferences is taken into consid-
eration."110 Therefore what "is needed for a valid inference is fully ex-
pressed; what is not needed is for the most part not indicated."1 1
It may not explain much to say a sentence is true. At least it is not
clear what its being true comes to. To explain linguistic behavior we
might, in place of truth, speak of inference among sentences and of
assertibility. The idea is that truth is just "a compliment paid to
sentences that seem to be paying their way"11 2 and so "not a profitable
topic."1 13 Definition and Theory sometimes interprets legal sentences
by inferences to and from them. Inferences to: the "answer" to ques-
tions like 'Why does Jones have a right?' "could only consist in two
things"-a "statement of some rule or rules of law" or "a statement
that these facts were here the case.1 1 4 Inferences from: 'Jones has a
right' is "an expression used to appeal to rules, to make claims, or give
decisions under them.' 15
We might then rewrite the passage in which Hart gives the truth
conditions116 as:
I elucidate 'a (legal) right': (1) We may assert, e.g.,
'Jones has a right' if the following conditions are satisfied:
(a) We often use sentences containing legal words in an
orderly way.
(b) We have said, 'Smith has an obligation'.
(c) Jones is authorized to say, 'Smith must fulfill the obli-
gation'. (2) From 'Jones has a right' and certain other
sentences we are licensed to infer 'Smith is to pay Jones $10',
etc.
We have substituted talk of assertibility for talk of truth. (1) and (2)
authorize inferences to and from the sentences with 'a right'. Regard-
ing (1) we have recast (a)-(c) to address language not aspects of the
nonlinguistic world. Consequently, 'true' has dropped out of Definition
and Theory. Hart's truth conditions give inferential relations among
110. FREGE, supra note 108, at 3.
111. Id.
112. R. RORTY, CONSEQUENCES OF PRAGMATISM (EssAYs: 1972-1980) xxv (1982).
113. Id. at xliii.
114. Definition and Theory, supra note 1, at 28.
115. Id. at 27.
116. See supra text accompanying note 92.
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sentences. Look at law as a set of sentences together with relations
among them; or as a set of rules for (game about) constructing and
manipulating sentences.
Definition and Theory denies 'the right' refers but is solicitous of
reference in saying why it does not. Implicitly rejected explanations in-
clude 'Nothing refers' and "the right' is gramatically a referring
phrase but because legal objects do not exist it lacks a referent'. But
Definition and Theory says only that 'the right' is part of the predicate
6__ has the right'; therefore, it is not independently a piece of lan-
guage at all; therefore, it is not a referring phrase.
Hart's analogues of the legal process are cricket matches and card
games. But 'Jones is out' and 'Jones has taken a trick' differ from
'Jones has a right' because they are less embedded in language. We say
the former sentences after having watched a ball being caught or cards
displayed. If we say them authoritatively, Jones retires from batting or
gets points. 'Jones has a right' and its less schematic counterparts are
used technically by or before a judge. They come between other sayings
like 'Smith said to Jones, 'I promise . . " or 'Smith is to pay Jones
ten dollars'. The judge, even the advocate (barrister), is not acquainted
with Jones, just with documents. She speaks referring to the record in
Jones v. Smith. It is less evident at law than at cricket or cards that we
ought to parse 'Jones has a right' into the predicate ' has a right'
and the referring expression 'Jones' so the latter refers to Jones.
At the beginning of the legal process, where we enter legal lan-
guage, events outside law make Jones's attorney begin actions, which
we may describe as inscribing 'Jones' on pieces of paper. At the other
end of the legal process, where we exit from legal language, papers
inscribed 'Jones' or events tied to them make Smith do something. The
intermediate moves are intralinguistic. We infer between inscriptions.
Again, Frege told us, in situations "[w]here inferences are to be drawn,
...it is essential that the same expression should occur in two prop-
ositions and should have exactly the same meaning in both cases"111
117. See supra note 67.
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For example, we would not be inferring correctly from
Jones said, 'I offer to sell Rose for $10'
and
Smith said, 'I accept'
to
Jones and Smith have contracted
unless the tokens 'Jones' and 'Smith' in all the sentences referred to
Jones and Smith respectively.
But this analysis is too strong. We do not need to satisfy ' and
refer to '. In other words we do not need to show that two
pieces of language refer to a particular extralinquistic thing. We need
only satisfy ' and corefer'. Coreference relates one word to an-
other word; it does not relate a word to the world. It holds only among
pieces of language. It is syntactical just as a case name or a docket
number put on documents to index them is syntactical.
Legal language interacts causally with other things. We may use
expressions such as ''Jones' refers to Jones' to explain this causal inter-
action. But maybe we do not need to appeal to reference; even if it is
best that we do so, 'refers' might still be intralinguistic."8
By explaining 'Jones has a right' by having 'Jones' refer to Jones
we presuppose there are persons analytically prior or external to the
law for 'Jones' to refer to. Recall that Sellars said originally a tree was
a way of being a person."1 9 Holmes at the beginning of The Common
Law also treated trees as persons. He imagined a tree that has fallen
upon (another) person and is retributively "chopped to pieces for the
gratification of a real or simulated passion"; 120 and he said that without
"personification" in these circumstances our "anger towards" it or
other "lifeless things would have been transitory, at most." 12' Com-
monly we constitute a person by its legal relations-"a person simply is
any being having legal rights and duties."' 22 Consequently we cannot
explain 'Jones has a right' by positing 'Jones' refers to Jones. We would
118. Brandom, Reference Explained Away: Anaphoric Reference and Indirect Description 81
J. PHIL. 469 (1984).
119. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
120. O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 12-13 (M. Howe ed. 1963).
121. Id. at 12.
122. Danto, Persons, in 6 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 110 (P. Edwards ed. 1967).
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be assuming what we are trying to explain.
CONCLUSION
(Hart as semantic realist) We have taken Hart to tell us to talk
not about the reference of legal words, but rather about the truth con-
ditions of legal sentences. We read him as intending to take predi-
cates-not sentences-as semantical primitives to obtain these truth
conditions. Legal theory analyzes '___ has a right' instead of 'a right'.
(Hart as neopragmatist) We interpret Hart most productively if we
disregard talk of truth conditions and replace talk of reference by talk
of coreference. Definition and Theory interpreted this way is about in-
ferential relations among legal sentences. It is striking that the text
bears these readings.

